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Finding a Place for the Freedom of Assembly
George N. Russo III
I. Introduction

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable."

1

President John F. Kennedy
Throughout American history the freedom of assembly has played a distinct role in
affecting social change and impacting public opinion. The freedom of assembly has facilitated
some of the most important social movements in American history: "antebellum abolitionism,
women's suffrage, the labor movement in the Progressive Era and after the New Deal, and the
Civil Rights movement."2 The power of assembly fought "the ideological tyranny that exploded
during the first Red Scare in the years surrounding the World War I and the second Red Scare of
1950s' McCarthyism."3 Abraham Lincoln once called "the right of peaceable assembly" part of
"the Constitutional substitute for revolution." 4 In the 21st century, however, the freedom of
assembly's power has waned when it is most needed. An erosion of the activities and capacities
of citizenship has impoverished American civic life and left our democracy at risk. 5 Political
participation has been consistently falling since the mid-1970s. 6 Recent events such as the
Supreme Court's Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision have made it even
harder to impact our political system. Ordinary citizens cannot afford a lobbyist or significant
political contributions. The rapidly growing inequality in American political equality and the
ability to impact political discourse is what makes a strong freedom of assembly so important.
1

President John F. Kennedy, Address on the First Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress (March 13, 1962).
John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom ofAssembly, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 565, 566 (2010).
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STEPHEN MACEDO ET AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK: HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION,
AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT I (The Brookings Institution, 2005).
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In the aftermath of September II, 20 II, increasing government regulation has neglected
the freedom of assembly in the name of national security. In 2012, President Barack Obama
signed H.R. 347: Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of2011. 7 The bill,
commonly referred to as the "trespass bill," 8 passed through the House of Representatives with a
vote of388-3. 9 The bill updates an obscure law originally passed in 1971 by lowering the
requisite criminal intent required to prosecute persons in restricted areas. 10 The trespass bill is
part of a set of laws which regulate assembly and contribute to the institutionalization of political
protest and dissentY These laws create what have been referred to as "free speech zones." 12
They are commonly used by the goverrunent to displace protesters with dissenting viewpoints. 13
While the law does not regulate the content of people's speech, it regulates the location of speech
and who hears the speech. However, the location of the assembly and protest is just as important
as the content of the speech. The law diminishes the goal of assembly which is to influence
public opinion. Despite small changes to the bill, the purpose of expanding the scope of the law
is obvious. Similar to other free speech zones, the purpose of the amendment to the bill is to
suppress political dissent and protest by regulating the location of assembly.
The Supreme Court's focus on the message of the protesters instead of the act of
assembly has diluted the power of assembly. This misguided approach allows the Court to
analyze assembly through the public forum doctrine. The doctrine chills protest because it allows
7

H.R. 347: Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of2011 (On the Senate Amendment).
Govtrack.us, (February 27, 2011), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/112-2012/h73 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
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Molloff, Jeanine, H.R. 347 'Trespass Bill' Criminalizes Protest, HUFFlNGTON POST,
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Rottman, Gabe, How Big a Deal is H.R. 347, That "Criminalizing Protest" Bilf?, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
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2013).
13
Rottman, Gabe, supra note 10.

for the imposition of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 14 The constitutional
significance of assemblies lies not with the content of the speech, but instead with the act of
assembly itself. The act of assembly presupposes that there is an actual place to assemble and be
heard. Protests and assemblies will of course consist of speeches being made and signs being
waved, but they are hardly the main objective of the exercise. 15 After all, most of the speeches
are inaudible and the signs often illegible. 16 The significance of the exercise is the assembly
itself. 17 A large public gathering forms a sense of solidarity, helps to influence public opinion,
and sends a collective message to public officials.

18

The Constitution recognizes assembly and speech as distinct rights. The application of
the public forum doctrine has cast a shadow over the freedom of assembly. The doctrine needs to
be re-conceptualized to accommodate the act of assembly and the importance of location. Laws
such as H.R. 347 and other "free speech zones" contribute to the institutionalization of political
which causes a significant erosion of the ability of the average citizen to influence public
opinion. Analyzing political protest and assembly through the prism of free speech minimizes the
importance ofthe act of assembly and the expressive message that it conveys. Assembly is a
form of expressive speech that places larger emphasis on the symbolism of the assembly itself
and its location than over the content of the message. The Supreme Court must draw a bright line
between free speech and the expressive significance oflocation within assembly.
Part I of this Note discusses the development of the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of the
freedom of assembly and the history ofH.R. 347. Part II highlights the importance of assembly
in American history. Part II-B examines the importance oflocation and ability to reach a target
14

Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. 103 S.Ct. 948, 956 (1983).
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 978, 1016 (March, 2011).
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audience in assembly. Part II-C explores the public forum doctrine's impact on assembly. Part IID looks at the impact of free speech zones and how they are created. Part II-E analyzes the
delicate balance that must be drawn between competing security interests and an individual's
right to assemble. And finally, Part II-F proposes a bright-line rule for the Supreme Court to
consider when evaluating freedom of assembly claims.
Part I: Background
The freedom of assembly, like the right of petition, was originally considered central to
securing democratic responsiveness and active democratic citizens. 19 We now view it instead as
simply another facet of the individual's right of free expression, focusing almost exclusively on
the question of whether the group's message will be heard. 20 This has happened because over
time the Supreme Court has conflated the freedom of assembly with free speech.
A. History of Supreme Court Jurisprudence

One of the first freedom of assembly cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence is Whitney v.

California (1972). 21 Even though Whitney is classified as a free speech case, it actually focuses
on association and assembly. 22 Anita Whitney was convicted under California's 1919 Criminal
Syndicalism Act for allegedly promoting the Communist Labor Party. 23 The organization she
belonged to was accused of advocating the violent overthrow of the government. 24 The focus of
her prosecution was not that Whitney's speech constituted criminal syndicalism, but merely that
she belonged to an organization. 25 Speech could not have been the basis for her prosecution
because Whitney herself had never advocated violence; to the contrary, she was on the record as

19

Inazu, supra note 2, at footnote 250.
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Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
22
Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 983.
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Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 366 (1927).
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Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 984.
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supporting peaceful, democratic activism.Z 6 What is significant about the majority's opinion is
that they speak ofthe rights of free speech, assembly, and association as separate components of
the First Amendment.Z 7 The case is most famous for Justice Brandeis' concurrence in which he
describes the statute as being directed "not at the practice of criminal syndicalism ... but at
association with those who propose to preach it."28 Justice Brandeis also refers to the right of
free speech and the right of assembly as distinct and coequal fundamental rights. 29
In 1937, the Supreme Court incorporated the freedom of assembly into the due process
clause in DeJonge v. Oregon (1937). 30 The Court stated that "the right to peaceable assembly is
a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental." 31 The right to
assemble is "one that cannot be denied without violating these fundamental principles which lie
at the base of all civil and political institutions."32 Again, in Thomas v. Collins (1945), the Court
described, speech, press, assembly and petition as separate and distinct rights that, in
combination constitute, "the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment." 33 The Court emphasized that restrictions of assembly could only be justified under
the 'clear and present danger' standard that the Court had adopted in its free speech cases."34 The
Court in Thomas focuses on the content of the speech in the assembly. Despite referring to
speech and assembly as distinct, the Court's application of the 'clear and present danger' test
suggests it is primarily concerned with the speech itself.
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Whitney, (Brandeis concurrence), at 372.
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Jd (concurrence), at 373.
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DeJonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
31
Jd at 364.
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34
Inazu, supra note 2, at 605.
26

27

The Supreme Court's increasing focus on the speech of assembly has enhanced its ability
to regulate and displace assembly under the public forum doctrine. Laws such as H.R. 347 do not
focus on actual speech as much as where they speech is made. In Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939), the
Court strongly emphasized the important role of public places in facilitating public discourse. 35
In Hague, the Court declared void on its face a city ordinance enacted to prevent labor meetings
in public places and to prevent the distribution ofliterature pertaining to the organization's
cause 36 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, declared that the "streets and parks ... have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."37 That dictum represents the foundation for modern standards regarding access to
public properties for purposes of speech and assembly. 38 Justice Roberts acknowledged the
historical-"immemorial," "time out of mind," and "from ancient times"-intersection between
expressive liberties and public places. 39 With this dictum, the Court implicitly recognized that
people in public places have always depending upon their ability to assemble and express their
views. 40
The Hague Court downgraded government from "owner" to "trustee" of public land. 41
The government has a responsibility to ensure that public places are available for citizens to
discuss matters of public concern. 42 As "trustee" of the public streets and parks, the government

35 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496,515 (1939).
36
Id
37 !d.
38
Timothy Zick, Property As/ And Constitutional Settlement, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1361, 1401 (Fall2010).
39 TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 184 (I" ed.
2008).
40 !d.
41
!d. at 185.
42 !d.

is charged with maintaining such places and permitting access to them for expressive purposes.

43

Hague implied that the people had an enforceable right to be in particular places for expressive
purposes. 44 Indeed, the legal scholar Harry Kalven, Jr. read Hague as establishing a democratic
"easement" for the people in public parks and streets, one that even permitted people to
"commandeer" certain public places for expressive purposes. 45 However, the Court also made
clear that the privilege of a citizen to the "streets and parks for communication of views on
national questions" is not absolute 46 In short, the citizen's privilege to the streets and parks is
just that, it is a privilege that cannot be abused.
In Schneider v. State ofNew Jersey (1939), the Supreme Court expanded upon Hague by
declaring that a city must allow speech in public places even if doing so will impose costs on the
city 47 Justice Roberts, again writing for the Court, declared "The streets are natural and proper
places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place."

48

Justice Roberts' dictum is so important because it clearly rejects the notion

that a city can restrict assembly and distribution of leaflets because there are other locations
available. In both Hague and Schneider, Justice Roberts mentions "appropriate" places for
expressive activity. 49 This builds upon the idea that goverrnnent's role with respect to public
places is more of a caretaker than an owner. 50 The goverrnnent's job was to be less about
determining what types of expressive speech was acceptable in public places and more about

43
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ensuring that citizens have access to public places to allow them to fulfill their expressive
needs. 5 1
B. The Evolution of 18 U.S.C. § 1752
Recent history has seen a flurry of government regulation designed to manipulate the
public forum for the purpose of displacing assembly and political protest. The most recent
example is the "Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 20 II. " 52 The
law, signed by President Barack Obama in March 2012, expands an existing statute that
criminalizes certain activity in and around areas that are restricted by the Secret Service. 53 The
bill slightly rewrites a short trespass law, originally passed in 1971 and amended a few times
since, that covers areas subject to heightened Secret Service security measures. 54 The bill was
passed in the aftermath of a period of political violence in the 1960s, and lawmakers sought to
enact legislation that would better protect American leaders. 55 The bill's purpose was to protect
the physical safety ofthe President, and more broadly, to secure the Office of the President. 56 To
achieve these goals, the bill extended federal protection to the President's specially designated
"temporary residences and offices," and to "posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted areas
where he is or will be visiting." 57 Importantly, when the Senate passed the bill, they were
particularly mindful of achieving a proper balance between the protection of the President and
America's strong protection of free speech. 58

51

Id.

52

H.R. 347, supra note 7.
Rottman, Gabe, Ready to Occupy? What You Need to Know about HR. 347, the "Criminalizing Protest" Law,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/ready-occupy-what-youneed-know-about-hr-34 7 -criminalizing-protest-law.
54
Rottman, supra note 10.
55
Elizabeth Craig, Note, Protecting the President from Protest: Using the Secret Service's Zone of Protection to
Prosecute Protesters, 9 J. Gender Race & Just 665, 669 (2006).
53
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The recently amended bill restricts protest in three places: (I) the White House or the
Vice President's residence; (2) a building or area where any individual under Secret Service
protection is visiting; (3) a building or area at which a National Special Security Event (or
"NSSE") is taking place. 59 These events can include anything from the Super Bowl to
presidential nominating conventions. 60 The bill also grants the Department of Homeland Security
significant discretion in designating what qualifies as one of these special events. 61 The updated
bill makes one potentially significant change, which makes it easier for the Secret Service to
abuse lawful protesters and assemblies. Under the original statute, a person had to act "willfully
and knowingly" when committing a crime. 62 In short, you had to know your conduct was
illegal. 63 The updated bill removes "willfully" and just requires a person to act "knowingly,"
which would mean that the person needs to know he or she is in a restricted area, but not
necessarily that the person is committing a crime. 64 The lower intent requirement allows for
greater prosecutorial discretion in punishing protesters in restricted areas.
The law has the effect of creating a "free speech zone" around Secret Service designated
areas. 65 These "free speech zones" are often used by the government to target viewpoints or to
displace protesters from the object of their protest. 66 While the law does not expressly address
free speech zones, the ACLU cautions that the updated law should be viewed as part of a set of
laws that make displacing dissent easier. 67 Even though the recent changes to 18 U.S.C. § 1752
are not groundbreaking, they signify an increasing ability of the government to control the

18 u.s.c. § 1752.
Rottman, supra note 10.
61 Id.
"Id.
63 !d.
64 I d.
59
60
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Rottman, supra note 10.

66

Id.
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location of political speech and assembly. Through regulations such as this, the government is
using the public forum doctrine to institutionalize political protest and dissent.
Part II. Doctrinal and Theoretical Significance of the Distinction between Free Speech and
Assembly
A. Importance of Assembly
Throughout American history, street comers 68 , parks 69 , and public squares 70 were the
quintessential locales for average Americans to reach other citizens with their words. However,
in the 21st century, partially due to the emergence of social media, the importance of location
within the traditional public forum has diminished. For many Americans, their daily activity has
shifted from publicly-owned to privately-owned spaces, like shopping malls, where the First
Amendment does not apply. 71 It is becoming harder and harder for average citizens to interact
with each other. This trend is augmented by governmental efforts to divest the public of the
traditional public forum. 72 Increasing efforts by government officials to displace assemblies and
protesters has created a need for a stronger emphasis on a freedom of assembly that is distinct
from the First Amendment's protection of free speech.
Protesters on streets throughout the country are typically dismissed by many observers.
However, during times of heightened national security, economic downturn, or civil rights
struggles, the United States has seen larger demonstrations with more negative externalities. 73 In
these instances, the media will take notice. It is precisely these more widespread expressive
messages of dissent that are the most effective ways for ordinary citizens to voice their opinions.
68

Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
Perry Education, supra note 14, at 955.
7
° Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,766 (1995).
71
Kevin Francis O'Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Eliminate Dissent, 5 First Amend. L. Rev. 201, 203-204
2007).
72
ld at 206-207.
73
Joseph D. Herrold, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the "Caging" of First Amendment Rights, 54
Drake L. Rev. 949, 973 (2006).
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Throughout American history, these larger demonstrations have proven successful at impacting
public discourse and affecting social progress. 74 Justice Brandeis stated that the protection of
political protest and dissent is essential in a democratic society:
Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government. 75
The freedom of assembly is a fundamental principle, distinct from the freedom of speech, which
enables public discussion.
Political equality is a key principle in democratic government and the gross inequalities
of political influence are dangerous to our democracy. 76 Political equality refers to the extent to
which citizens have an equal voice over governmental decisions. 77 American political equality is
expressed through one-person/one-vote, equality before the law, and equal rights of free
speech. 78 Citizen participation is at the heart of political equality because political activity is the
means by which citizens inform their government of their needs and preferences. 79 The freedom
of assembly is perhaps the most effective way for citizens to induce political action. Growing
political inequality makes it harder for citizens to influence government action and discourages
political participation. Part of influencing the political system requires having a certain type of
access to forums and locations.

74

Inazu, supra note 2, at 566 (referencing claims of assembly standing against the ideological tyranny that exploded
during the first Red Scare in the years surrounding the First World War and the second Red Scare of 1950s'
McCarthyism).
75
Whitney, at 648.
76
Sidney Verba, Thoughts About Political Equality: What Is It? Why Do We Want It?
77 /d.
78 /d.
79 !d.

Expressive speech and political protest are most effective when made through the
freedom of assembly. Indeed, the two are inextricably intertwined. The direct benefit to any
particular person of expressing a dissenting political view is relatively slight. 80 Unless that
person is a person of unusual power and influence, his or her individual voice is unlikely to have
much of an impact on public opinion or government policy. 81 However, the cost of that person
being imprisoned for his or her speech is potentially staggering. 82 Laws such as H.R. 347
increase the stakes for those expressing their opinions by making assembling in certain locations
a federal offense. Protesters are often "chilled" in their willingness to sign a petition, march in a
rally, or speak on soapbox if doing so risks criminal prosecution. 83 Moreover, this effect is
multiplied across society. 84 Even though many Americans may share the same political and
dissenting views, they all may be individually "chilled" in their willingness to express their
opinion if they fear punishment for doing so. 85 The fragility of speech and assembly only further
underscores the importance of enhancing the freedom of assembly as a means of promoting
political equality.
B. The Importance of "Location" in Assembly

The current doctrinal approach to freedom of assembly and political protest is analyzed
through a free speech lens. The two have been conflated over time where courts focus on the
content of speech heard in an assembly. 86 This misguided approach minimizes assembly to being
a mere vehicle for enhancing speech. While every assembly contains an element of speech, the
Court's emphasis on speech underscores the true value of assembly in a democratic society.
80

GEOFF STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH lN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THEWAR ON
TERRORISM, (page), I" ed. (2004).
81

Id
Id
83
Id
84
Id
82

85

86

Stone, at.. ..
Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 980.

Assembly is a collective expressive message that only functions when assemblies are allowed to
gather in certain locations. The most important aspect of assembly is location. 87 However,
because courts focus on the actual speech of the assembly, the public forum doctrine is applied to
the freedom of assembly. The doctrine allows for government to displace assembly and political
protest through reasonable, time, and manner restrictions.

88

H.R. 347 is part of a series of laws that displace assembly and protesters away from a
meaningful location. The law is not concerned with the content of speech; rather it focuses on the
target the speech is directed toward. Under H.R. 347 and similar laws, it has become routine for
the Secret Service to separate gatherers based on viewpoint. Protesters who refuse to confine
their expressive speech to "free speech zones" are arrested. 89 In one instance, a "free speech
zone" consisted of a large baseball field surrounded by a six-foot high chain-link fence and was
located about three quarters of a mile from the presidential appearance. 90 Once inside the zone,
protesters were not permitted to leave until the event ended. 91 Furthermore, reporters were
generally not permitted to enter the zone 92 While dissenters are segregated away, those who are
not protesting are permitted to stand within eyeshot, earshot, and camera-shot of the President 93
In another case, a protester at an airport where Air Force One landed was arrested under 18
U.S.C. § 1752 when he refused to go to a designated "speech zone" to display a sign that said
"No War for Oil."94 Although it was not clearly marked, the Secret Service maintained that a
100-yard area surrounding the airport constituted a "secured zone."95 Despite the fact that pro-
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Timothy Zick, Space. Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 439, 443 (2006).
Perry Education, supra note 14, at 955.
89
Your right to say it... but over there, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, September 28, 2003.
90
SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, at 235.
88
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92

administration individuals were allowed near this secured zone, the protester's conviction was
upheld over a First Amendment challenge. 96
Political protest and dissent are forms of expressive speech that are most effective in
public spaces, especially in places where the object of the protest is present 97 Specifically, free
speech zones take away protesters' ability to reach their target audience. The goal of these
protests is to gain attention and impact the status quo. Assemblies want to draw attention to their
cause and convince others of their cause. 98 The Occupy Wall Street movement proves just how
effective the location of an assembly can be in expressing a message. The location of the
"encampment" in Zuccotti Park in the heart of Wall Street gave life to the Occupy movement.
The media became fascinated with the movement and it lead to Occupy protests springing up all
over the United States. 99 While impossible to prove, it seems unlikely that the Occupy movement
would have spread so rapidly had it not been allowed to commandeer Zuccotti Park.
The symbol and power of a location can serve as an important mouthpiece for an
organization's message. Zuccotti Park, located in the center of the target of the Occupy protests,
provided the perfect vehicle for the Occupy message. The first month of the Occupy Wall Street
protest marked an obvious shift in the way the media covered the economic crisis in 2011. 100
Due to Occupy Wall Street, the media focused more on unemployment and jobs instead of the
debt in the weeks following the debt ceiling negotiations on Capitol Hill. 101 In the last week of
July, 2011 the word "debt" was mentioned more than 7,000 times on MSNBC, CNN, and Fox
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SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, at 235.
Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of "Place" in First American Jurisprudence, 75 Fordham L.
Rev. 2587, 2588 (2007).
98
Herrold, supra note 73, at 971.
99
Andrew Grossman, Spreading Protests Yet to Jell, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (October 17, 2011).
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100
How the 99 Percent are Changing America One News Story at a Time, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://thinkprogress.org/progress-report/the-99-percent-effect-on-the-media/.
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News, and "unemployed" was mentioned only 75 times 102 A review of the same three networks
between October 10 and October 16,2011 during the Occupy movement, the word "debt"
received just 398 mentions while "jobs" received 2,738 and "Wall Street" netted 2,378 103 The
assembly was able to impact public discourse and the marketplace of ideas in the way that
corporate spending is now able to in the aftermath of the Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission decision. That the Supreme Court has strengthened corporate speech makes it more
paramount than ever to strengthen assembly.
In Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes' first spoke of the "marketplace ofideas." 104
A marketplace of ideas presupposes an actual place in the public forum for ordinary citizens to
gather and share their ideas. At a time when billions of dollars were being poured into the 2012
Presidential Election, 105 the voice of ordinary Americans seems drowned out in the marketplace
of ideas. Increasing government restrictions and the expansion of corporate speech threatens to
fill the marketplace and drown out opposing viewpoints. Unable to form their own political
lobbying group, Occupy Wall Street formed their own movement to spread their message. They
just needed the right location.
Restrictions on the location of assembly and speech are justified under the public forum
doctrine due to their "secondary effects." 106 Particularly with free speech zones, regulations are
designed to prevent crime and other harmful effects that may arise from assembly. 107 However, it
seems that by merely zoning speech to another location, speech is not viewed as being

Id.
!d.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
105
Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Vote in 2012 Will Be Record, $6 Billion Election, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www .reuters.com/article/20 11108/3 0/us-usa-campaign-spending-idUSTRE77T3ZX20 II 0830.
106
Crocker, supra note 96, at 2596.
107
David L. Hudson, Jr. The Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms", 37
Washburn L.J. 55 (1997) (secondary effects include: noise, security problems, residential privacy, traffic congestion,
increased criminal activity).
102

103
104

suppressed but merely relocated so as to prevent potential criminal activity. 108 While the
prevention of crime and other negative "secondary effects" is an important consideration, the
Supreme Court must draw a bright line rule which recognizes the importance oflocation within
the freedom of assembly.
C. The Public Forum Doctrine's Impact on Assembly
The public forum doctrine's focus on the content of speech neglects the importance that
location plays in the freedom of assembly. Part of the rationale behind the public forum doctrine
is that because there are so many other places or venues for speech, the government can
reasonably restrict access to those places it designates as non-public. 109 However, the real query
for the freedom of assembly should be whether there are adequate places to assemble. Assembly
is not speech. Assembly is entirely dependent upon having a place in public to gather and
assemble. While the content of the assembly's verbal communication is undoubtedly part of
every assembly, the larger expressive message of assembly is dependent upon location and
access to the public.
A significant number of public forum cases in the Supreme Court have not involved
individual speakers seeking access to government properties. 110 Instead, they have involved
groups wanting to use government property and public land to assemble, recruit, and send a
collective, expressive message to the public or government officials. 111 Hague and Schneider
both involved groups gathering on public land for the purpose of reaching other people. The
passing ofliterature in Schneider would not be effective if the assembly was designed to a less
populated area of the city. Assembly is dependent upon location and access to specific audiences.
108

Crocker, supra note 96, at 2596.
Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a Constitutional Model that
Focuses on the Existence ofAlternative Channels of Communication, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 477, 495 (2007).
no Bhagwat, supra note 15, at 1016.
109

"' Id

Initially, the concept of the public forum was intended to be speech protective. 112 Whether the
concept was intended to establish a system of categorizing public property in order to define
access rights for expressive purposes is less certain.

113

However, over the past fifty years, the

Court has traveled a winding course that has ultimately led to its current articulation of a doctrine
that has attracted widespread criticism and concern among legal commentators and among
various Justices. 114 The Court's application of the public forum doctrine to assembly allows it to
displace political protest and take away its effectiveness.
Part of the rationale behind the public forum doctrine holds that, because there are so
many other places for speech, the government can restrict access to certain places it designates as
"non-public." 115 The Supreme Court's focus on the content of speech instead of the actual
location of the assembly has led to a weaker freedom of assembly. To express a message of
political protest or dissent is to attempt to reach new audiences and the object of the protest. No
expressive message is made when the object of the protest cannot see or hear the assembly.
Recent regulation has targeted the elimination of the dissenters' ability to appear as dissent to
specific audiences. 116 Preventing groups from appearing as dissent has led to the increasing
reliance on free speech zones as a way of protecting public order and promoting security.
D. Creation of Free Speech Zones
The Supreme Court's application of the public forum doctrine to the freedom of assembly
enables government officials to create "free speech zones" around important locations and
audiences. The primary aim of a free speech zone is to control the location of public expression
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of opinion. 117 These regulations are routinely permitted if they are reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions.
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A government regulation is permitted if it furthers an important or

substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction of alleged First Amendment freedom is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 119 Free speech zones are difficult to
challenge because the concept of a free speech zone is too amorphous for a court to rule on in the
abstract. 120 Regardless of their motives, most assemblies confined to free speech zones are there
to express their viewpoints with the intention of changing the minds of others. 121 Denying these
individuals access to their target audience denies them the ability to participate in public
discourse. 122 These protesters are forced to find less conducive locations and methods to express
their message.
The rationale behind the acceptance of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions is
that courts assume there are other places for people to express their message. 123 However, that is
not always the case. Courts have classified "spatial restrictions are unrelated to expressive
content." 124 These restrictions are "treated as inarguably rational means of serving governmental
interests such as maintaining order and security." 125 Free speech zones render protest ineffective
by forcing protesters away from their target audience. The restrictions on the location of
assembly contribute to the institutionalization of political protest and dissent.
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The main problem posed by free speech zones is that the way in which they are enforced
can effectively censor those wishing to exercise their liberty. The public forum doctrine's
allowance of reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions is problematic when
entire mediums of communication are prohibited by government regulatory action. 126 Even if
such zones are applied to all persons regardless of the nature of their expressive activity, if the
zone effectively silences communication, it should be found unconstitutional. 127 These protesters
are barred from entering the marketplace of ideas. While audiences cannot be forced to listen to
assemblies, to be a valid time, place, and manner restriction, the regulation of assemblies should
provide the assembly with an opportunity to reach their intended audience, irrespective of
whether the audience actually listens. 128 Free speech zones can effectively censor dissenting
viewpoints and limit public debate and restrict the spread of ideas. 129
Institutionalization refers to the methods that are used to police and regulate political
protest and dissent. Fear of police crackdowns on demonstrations and protests has led to entire
public events being stage-managed from their inception, with protesters willingly negotiating
every detail with officials except, of course, the actual content of their message. 130 This type of
control over assemblies and protests defeats the entire purpose. The goal of the assembly is to
influence public debate and interact with others. 131 The goals and objectives of assembly cannot
be achieved when assemblies are forced to negotiate ahead of time with the very same people
they are protesting. 132 When the Secret Service is allowed to designate protesters into "free
speech zones" and regulate them away from political conventions or politicians then they are
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unable to enter the marketplace. 133 The Hague dictum purported to reject the ownership principle
and to place the public streets and parks under the protection of a public trust. 134 Layer upon
layer of permit and other time, place, and marmer regulations has resulted in a system in which
government officials can use their discretion to filter what information enters the marketplace. 135
Whether an assembly seeks to gather outside a political convention, near a presidential
speech, or in the heart of Wall Street, it is likely to be restricted by expressive zoning. Today
speakers must navigate a gauntlet of official "demonstration zones," "free speech zones,"
"buffers," "bubbles," "cages," and "pens." 136 These types of free speech zones fundamentally
alter the relationship between the traditional public forum and dissent. 137 The concept of place
was built on the importance of protecting individual speech, but also on the ability of citizens to
gain access to different ideas within the marketplace. 138 It was for that reason that Justice Roberts
claimed in Schneider that it was unconstitutional to prohibit speech simply because it could be
exercised in some other location. 139 In every free speech zone or demonstration zone there is the
suppression of political speech through allegedly content-neutral regulation of the public
forum. 140 The goal is being able to strike the proper balance between the negative secondary
effects of speech and our First Amendment protections.
Many laws, including H.R. 347, contribute to the institutionalization of assembly through
the significant discretion offered to government officials. They allow allegedly content-neutral
restrictions to have a selective effect on the speech of political protest. 141 For instance, the "free
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speech" zones set up by the Secret Service to shield the President are not directed toward
supporters, who are often granted closer access to the President, but instead to protesters who are
kept at a significant distance.
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Legal scholar Timothy Zick has lamented the negative impact

free speech zones and other "spatial tactics" have on political dissent. 143 Insofar as the success of
political and social movements depends on things like freedom of movement, ease of assembly,
and spontaneous expression, these tactics present substantial obstacles. 144 They separate speakers
and listeners in public spaces and they facilitate listener avoidance of expression that is
presumptively offensive or dangerous, a presumption arising from official displacement. 145
Listeners are "protected" not only from speakers, but from their message as well. 146 In the course
of protecting itself and its officials, the government is driving protest into comers and placing it,
quite literally, in pens and cages.
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This type of displacement will continue to be upheld by the

courts so long as the government can identify a credible and content-neutral interest in
maintaining this separation.
Courts, such as the First Circuit in Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City ofBoston, 148 have routinely
upheld free speech zones in the name of security. Despite the district judge likening the
demonstration zone to an "internment camp," 149 the First Circuit upheld the prison-like zone. 150
In its defense of the zone, the Secret Service presented information ex parte concerning "specific
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intelligence concerning security threats." 151 The Judge's decision was based solely on "past
experience at comparable events, including the 2000 DNC in Los Angeles." 152 On appeal, the
First Circuit found that the security measures imposed "a substantial burden on free expression,"
noting lack of physical interaction with delegates, direct limitations on aural communications,
and impaired visual communication with signs or other media by the cramped space and meshed
screening. 153 In upholding the demonstration zone, the court reasoned that "the quantum of
'threat' evidence was sufficient to allow the trier to weigh it in the balance." 154 The deferential
standard employed by the First Circuit in upholding the monstrous demonstration zone further
highlights the necessity of a bright line rule to protect the freedom of assembly.
E. Balancing the Competing Security Interest Versus Assembly
The displacement of dissent and political protest at presidential appearances and national
conventions provides the greatest contrast of the competing interests of the government's
security interest and the freedom of assembly's expressive messaging. While such laws intend to
protect the President and others under Secret Service protest, they also separate protesters based
on their dissenting viewpoints. Such regulations would be presumptively unconstitutional as
content-based discrimination on speech. 155 However, these free speech zones are consistently
upheld because the security interests trump the First Amendment in these instances. There is a
long history of free speech zones being used to discriminate against those expressing dissenting
views. 156 It does not take much to draw the attention of the Secret Service. There are widely
reported instances of protesters being removed for wearing opposing shirts and buttons, holding
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up signs, and even silent protesting. 157 The recent amendments increasing prosecutorial
discretion through H.R. 347 make the application of these laws even more troublesome.
H.R. 347 gives the Secret Service discretion in developing restricted areas around certain
specially designated events. The Secret Service can declare an event a "National Special Security
Event" which enables them to increase security and use greater discretion. However, courts must
evaluate both the government's security interest and the method used to further that interest in
order to determine its constitutionality. 158 The increased power granted to the Secret Service also
means there is a greater possibility for abuse of that power at the expense of the First
Amendment.
Courts have overlooked restrictions in the form of "demonstration zones" or "cages" at
political conventions such as the Democratic National Convention in 2004. 159 The
Demonstration Zone ("DZ") was a cage which barricaded and fenced in protesters outside of the
Fleet Center in Boston. 160 To keep anyone from climbing out, there were two layers of thick
mesh added to the fences and coiled razor wire at its apex. 161 With National Guardsmen closely
watching the pen, protesters were not allowed to leave, would have no meaningful access to the
delegates, and were forbidden from passing out leaflets or other materials. 162 A federal judge
described the DZ as an "internment camp" which was "a symbolic affront to the First
Amendment." 163 Despite the federal judge's strong criticism, both the trial and appellate courts
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upheld the use of the DZ due to "security" concerns.
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Not a single protester ever decided to

enter the DZ. 165
Events like the DZ at the 2004 Democratic National Convention demonstrate the delicate
balance that needs to be struck between assembly and security concerns. The security
precautions were so intense that protesters expressive message was muted because they refused
to enter the DZ. The obvious goal ofthe protesters was to influence the discussion that was going
on inside of the Convention. Troublingly, the First Circuit reasoned that, "although the
opportunity to interact directly with the body of delegates by, say, moving among them and
distributing literature, would doubtless have facilitated the demonstrators' ability to reach their
intended audience, there is no constitutional requirement that demonstrators be granted that sort
of particularized access." 166 The court dismissed the importance of the assembly's location by
stating the "messages expressed beyond the first-hand sight and sound of the delegates
nonetheless have a propensity to reach the delegates through television, radio, the press, the
internet, and other outlets." 167 The court completely ignored the significance of location. 168
Location creates a more effective medium for expressing a message, but the court failed to
consider that not all locations are interchangeable. 169 The protesters would have no chance of
influencing the media's coverage of the Convention from inside the "internment camp."
Part of maintaining order around these events also includes protecting those who wish to
exercise their First Amendment liberties. The government should be just as concerned with
protecting the individuals within free speech zones as they are with protecting the group,
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location, or important official that justified the zone in the first place. 170 Those exercising their
First Amendment liberties are exposed to the same threats and dangers as those outside the free
speech zone but they lack the same ability to act to ensure their own safety .17l If the alleged
security interests are enough to warrant the creation of free speech zones, then surely they are
enough of a threat to ensure the protection of those Americans seeking to express their views.
In the 21" century and the age of terrorism, there is clearly a strong need to protect
American leaders and public officials. However, that interest must be balanced against the goal
of giving a voice to the minority in a democratic society. These expressions of political protest
through assembly have always served as a check on political power in American history.
Regulations designed to restrict dissenters away from their audience are well-intentioned.
However, displacement can and often does immobilize protest, mute-speakers, and distort their
messages. 172 The architecture of free speech zones does those things. They prevent movement,
facilitate surveillance, and prohibit certain forms of expression. 173 Restrictions on assembly and
political protest literally capture dissenting and sometimes unpopular views in cages. In the
coming years it will be increasingly important to liberate the freedom of assembly from the
backdrop of free speech within the First Amendment.
F. The Supreme Court Must Create a Bright Line Rule
In order to rescue the freedom of assembly from being captured by the public forum
doctrine, the Supreme Court must place greater emphasis on the act of assembly and the location
in which assembly takes place. The Court's focus on the speech of an assembly allows for the
government to create free speech zones and prevent assemblies from reaching their target
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audience. There's no question that the primary rationale behind expressive zoning is to maintain
security and public order. 174 A government imposed free speech zone is unnecessary in most
events because authorities can adequately maintain crowd control and detain anyone who
becomes violent or disruptive. 175 The government should take great care to make certain that free
speech zones are used only when warranted by the circumstances so that free speech zones are
the exception, and not the rule, for regulating First Amendment expression in public.
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Free speech zones constraint the only method ordinary Americans have at making their
voices heard. In the wake of Citizens United, unprecedented corporate spending is now allowed
to fill the void left by a weakened freedom of assembly. These Americans cannot afford
lobbyists or Super PACs. There is a strong associational expression that comes when protesters
join other likeminded protesters in expressing their message en masse. 177 These are people who,
individually, are without sufficient means to impact the public discourse. The importance is
growing to provide greater assembly protection to allow the minority a voice in to compete with
expanding influence that corporations and special interests have on speech. Not only can
government restrictions create free speech zones to constrain minority viewpoints, cash-heavy
lobbyists can also drown out opposing viewpoints. A stronger freedom of assembly is needed in
order for dissenting viewpoints to combat increasing government restrictions and corporate
spending.
The Supreme Court must liberate the public forum in order to allow for ordinary citizens
to occupy traditional places to express their messages. Instead of being preoccupied with
alternate areas to speak, the Supreme Court should ask itself whether there are alternate places to
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assemble and reach the target audience. This type of bright line rule creates a distinction between
two different and coequal fundamental rights. Displacement of protesters far out of sight from
their audience takes away the incentive for dissenters to speak their voice. In a democratic
society it is critical that citizens be allowed to express their views, especially when those vies are
in the minority.
The Supreme Court must acknowledge the important role that location plays in the
expressive message of an assembly. While it is impossible for the Court to create a bright line
boundary restriction due to the fact-intensive nature of each inquiry, the Court must ensure that
the communication of the assembly is not curtailed. 178 When assemblies cannot be seen, heard,
or otherwise exchanged the free speech zone's restriction on speech violates the First
Amendment. 179 The freedom of assembly needs a rule which protects expressive messages of
assemblies and allows that message to reach its target audience. The ability for the target
audience to see speakers in order to ascertain that efforts are being made to communicate with
them should be a requirement for the imposition of a free speech zone. 180 Segregating an
assembly away from the object oftheir protest is effectively filtering what information and ideas
are allowed to enter the marketplace. Deciding which ideas are appropriate is not the job of the
govermnent but is a decision for those individuals in the marketplace.
The Court should require a heavy burden on the govermnent to justify such restrictions.
The govermnent must present evidence that alternate areas near the target audience were
contemplated. The government must not be able to blindly rely on the broad shield of national
security. Having protesters file into demonstration zones and cages under the vague threat of
national security and public order suppresses the freedom of assembly and dilutes the
178
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marketplace of ideas. The Court should require that actual locations for protest were accounted
for but that they ultimately proved unworkable.
Conclusion
The time has come for the Supreme Court to liberate the freedom of assembly from the
shadows of free speech doctrine. In today's society, it is becoming increasingly important for
ordinary Americans to express their feelings. Movements and political protests around the
country and throughout history prove that assembly is the most effective method of expressive
communication. The Supreme Court's focus on the content of an assembly's message instead of
the expressive act of assembly has weakened this fundamental First Amendment right. This
focus on the speech aspect of assembly confuses the freedom of assembly with freedom of
speech. This allows for the government to impose reasonable content-neutral restrictions on
assemblies. Government officials are permitted to displace assemblies while not regulating their
actual speech. This displacement weakens the significance of location within the freedom of
assembly.
Freedom of assembly doctrine must acknowledge the importance of location. The
expressive significance of assembling in a certain location is what makes assembly so effective.
Courts have allowed the government to regulate assembly far away from its target audience so
long as there is another place for the assembly to speak its message. This approach distorts the
actual purpose behind the assembly. Individuals who join in an assembly are there for the
purpose of expressing their viewpoints with the intent to change the minds of others. 181
Regulations which confine assemblies into free speech zones filter the assembly out of the
marketplace of ideas. Assemblies must be afforded the ability to reach their target audience.
Without access to its intended audience, the assembly is without a purpose.
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The main purpose of assembly is not the content of its speech but the assembly itself.
Analyzing the freedom of assembly through the public forum doctrine ignores the key distinction
between assembly and speech. The deferential standard granted by the courts allows reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions to displace assembly from its target and weakens this First
Amendment liberty. Without access to its target audience, the members of the assembly are
dissuaded from expressing their opinions and the marketplace of ideas is diluted. The location of
the assembly allows for a strong connection to form between the members of the assembly and
helps influence public opinion. The Supreme Court must draw a bright line distinction between
the freedom of assembly and free speech.

